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Foreign Portfolio Investors before and during a Crisis
Woochan Kim and Shang-Jin Wei
1. Introduction
In the context of recent Asian financial crisis, it has been alleged that foreign portfolio
investors may have been positive feedback traders (e.g., rushing to buy when the market is
booming and rushing to sell when the market is declining), and eager to mimic each other’s
behavior ignoring information about the fundamentals.  Behaviors such as these could have
exacerbated the crisis to an extent not otherwise warranted by economic fundamentals.
Understanding foreign investors’ behavior is also relevant for the discussion on the desirability of
capital controls. Careful statistical documentation of investor trading behavior to prove or
disprove these hypotheses has been relatively lacking.  But the hypothesis can be connected with
an emerging literature on behavioral finance, mostly in the domestic finance context.  For
example, it has been argued that individual investors’trading is often driven by irrational,
sentimental shocks (for example, see Lee, Shleifer and Thaler, 1990 and 1991 for an explanation
of the discounts on the closed-end funds).  As another example, again using evidence from
domestic market data, it has been argued that institutional investors often exhibit herding
behavior, though the tendency is quantitatively small (see Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny,
1992).  There are also theoretical models in which there are irrational noise traders, and rational
investors pursue positive feedback strategies, destabilizing the prices in the process (De Long,
Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann, 1990).
In this paper, we aim to provide an account of the behavior of foreign portfolio investors
before and during a crisis.  We distinguish between institutional versus individual investors, and
between those who reside in the emerging market in question (with potentially more information
about the fundamentals) and those outside.   We examine how the behavior of each type of
foreign investors may have evolved from the pre-crisis to the crisis periods.  We also investigate
how they may have reacted to the news about the emerging market in question.  We make use of2
a unique data set that details monthly positions of every foreign investor in every stock in the
Korean stock market from December 1996 to June 1998.
Frankel and Schmukler (1996, 1998) have examined an important aspect of portfolio
investment in emerging markets, namely, possible informational asymmetry between domestic
and international investors. But their data set (prices of closed end country funds and their
corresponding net asset values) does not allow them to distinguish between institutional versus
individual investors, or to investigate possible momentum trading or herding behavior.
Choe, Kho, Stulz (1998) use transaction data on the Korean stock market (December,
1996 to December, 1997) to examine the effect of foreign investor trading on the Korean stock
price.  They find evidence of foreign investors engaging in positive feedback trading and herding,
but the evidence becomes weaker or insignificant in the last three months of their sample.
Furthermore, they find that the foreign investor-initiated trades are associated with abnormal
returns only in a narrow window (say ten minutes) of time around the trade.
Our paper is different from theirs in a number of ways. First, the two data samples are
different.  While their data is of much higher frequency than ours, the buy and sell trades in their
sample are not associated with an investor ID.  Thus, in their paper, to compute the herding
measures, each buy- or sell-trade has to be assumed to originate from a separate investor.  As
they acknowledged, this assumption could induce upward bias in the computed herding statistics
since the same investor could have executed multiple trades (likely in the same direction) in a
given period of time.  In our sample, as every investor’s position is identified by a unique ID
number, we do not have to make this assumption, and can presumably obtain more accurate
herding statistics.
Second, their paper does not separate foreign institutional versus foreign individual
investors, which we do.  Indeed, we find some systematic differences in the trading behavior
between the two groups.  Third, our data which extends to the end of June, 1998, allows for a
better comparison of the differences in trading behavior before and during the crisis (at least for
trading patterns involving monthly frequency).  We think November 1997 is a reasonable month
to mark the beginning of the crisis (to be explained below).  We have eight months of data since
the crisis broke in Korea as compared with their two months of (transaction data).  For example,
in contrast to their finding, we find fairly strong evidence of continued herding and positive3
feedback trading during the crisis.  Furthermore, institutional traders residing in Korea have
switched from negative feedback traders before the crisis to positive feedback traders during the
crisis.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our data sets.  Sections 3, 4, and 5
examine three aspects of foreign investor behavior, respectively: feedback trading, herding, and
reaction to news.  Section 6 offers some concluding remarks.
2.   Data
In this paper, we make use of three data sets.
2.1       Investor Position Data
For each investor, identified by an ID code, this data set contains following information,
among others: (i) month-end share holding for each stock listed in the Korea Stock Exchange
(KSE), (ii) nationality, (iii) residence, (iv) type (e.g. individual or institutional), and (v) whether
the investment ceiling is binding or not for that investor in that month.  For confidentiality
reasons, only the codes but not the names of the investors are available.
The data set spans from December 1996 to June 1998.  On November 18, the Bank of
Korea gave up defending the Korean Won. And on November 21, the Korean government asked
the IMF for a bail out.  Hence, we regard November, 1997 as when the crisis began. By this
criterion, our data covers ten months before the crisis and eight months during the crisis.
The data set was kindly provided by the Korea Securities Computer Corporation
(KOSCOM), an affiliate to the Korea Stock Exchange (KSE).  The position data by investor and
by stock is hard to come by in general.  In our case, the Korean restriction on foreign ownership
of domestic stocks and the need to enforce it helps to make this data available.
1
                                                          
1 For example, between May and November 1997, foreign investors, in aggregate, could not own more than 23% of
the outstanding shares per company and foreign investors, individually, could not own more than 6%.  Since May
1998, there exists no restriction on foreign ownership, except for two listings (POSCO and KEPCO). Upper ceiling
on foreign investors in aggregate changed from 10% (Jan, 1992) ￿ 12% (Dec, 1994) ￿ 15% (Jul, 1995) ￿ 18%
(Apr, 1996) ￿ 20% (Oct, 1996) ￿ 23% (May, 1997) ￿ 26% (Nov, 1997) ￿ 55% (Dec, 1997) ￿ 100% (May,
1998).  As for individual foreign investor, the upper ceiling changed from 3% (Jan, 1992) ￿ 4% (Apr, 1996) ￿ 5%
(Oct, 1996) ￿ 6% (May, 1997) ￿ 7% (Nov, 1997) ￿ 50% (Dec, 1997) ￿ 100% (May, 1998).4
2.2       Stock Data
For each stock, we collect information on (i) month-end price, (ii) month-end number of
shares outstanding, (iii)  monthly transaction volume (and value), and (iv) whether the
investment ceiling is binding or not in that month.  In addition, we also collect information on the
Korea Composite Stock Price Index (KOSPI) from KOSCOM and month-end Won/dollar
exchange rate from the Federal Reserve Board’s website.
Figures 1 and 2 plot the exchange rate (US dollar/1,000 Won) and the stock market price
index (KOSPI), respectively.  Combining the two pieces of information, Figure 3 traces the
dollar value of a $100 investment in KOSPI on January 1, 1997 throughout the sample (to June
30, 1998).
2.3       News
To examine foreign investors’ reaction to news, we have constructed a data set on the
numbers of good and bad news on the Korean economy, by source and by month.  It is
constructed by searching five daily newspapers (Wall Street Journal, Financial Times, New York
Times, Washington Post, and Korea Herald) using Dow-Jones Interactive and Lexis-Nexis.
Details on filtering and labeling are explained in Section 5.
3. Positive Feedback Trading
There are concerns that international portfolio investors may be positive feedback traders,
and that positive feedback traders could destabilize the market.  Positive feedback trading pattern
is one with which one buys securities when the prices rise and sells when the prices fall.  This
trading pattern can result from extrapolative expectations about prices, from stop-loss orders --
automatically selling when the price falls below a certain point, from forced liquidations when an
investor is unable to meet her margin calls, or from a portfolio insurance investment strategy
which calls for selling stocks when the price falls and buying it when the price rises.
Positive feedback trading can destabilize the market by moving asset prices away from
the fundamentals.  At least since Friedman (1953), many economists believe that positive
feedback traders cannot be important in market equilibrium as they are likely to lose money on5
average.  This view has been challenged in the last decade or so.  De Long, Shleifer, Summers,
and Waldmann (1990) argued that in the presence of noise traders, even rational investors may
want to engage in positive feedback trading, and in the process destabilizes the market.
Empirical examination of this issue has emerged recently.  Using quarterly data on U.S.
pension funds in the U.S.  market, Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1992, LSV for short in later
reference) did not find evidence of significant amount of positive feedback trading.  On the other
hand, using transaction-level data, Choe, Kho, and Stulz (1998) do find evidence that foreign
investors as a group engage in positive feedback trading in Korea.
This paper goes beyond the earlier studies. We decompose the universe of foreign
investors alone two different dimensions (i.e. into four different cells).  First, we dissect them
into institutional versus individual investors.  Along the second, we distinguish those residing in
Korea versus those outside.  As a further extension, we separate non-resident foreign investors
into U.S. investors, Asian investors, and the rest.
Methodology and sample construction
The objective is to examine the connection between the trading behaviors of the investors
(within a given sub-group) and the previous month performance of the stocks.  We examine the
connection  for three time periods: the whole sample (January, 1997 - June, 1998), the pre-crisis
period (January, 1997-October, 1997), and the in-crisis period (November, 1997-June, 1998).
Within each time period, we form five approximately equally sized (in terms of stock-
months) portfolios based on the previous month performance of the stocks.  The performance of
a stock is defined as the return of the stock in excess of the market return, minus the depreciation
of the Korean won exchange rate against the U.S. dollar.  That is, the return for a particular stock
from month t-1 to month t is [ln(Pt) - ln(Pt-1)] - [ln(KOSPIt) - ln(KOSPIt-1)] - [ln(St) - ln(St-1)],
where Pt, KOSPIt, and St are the price of the stock (stock subscript omitted), KOSPI index, and
Won/$ exchange rate at time t.
Following LSV (1992), we employ two measures of investors’ trading direction: a scale-
adjusted net purchase and a buyers’ ratio:6
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The first measure describes the net purchase (scaled by the total trading).  The
denominator (the scale adjustment) makes sure that a large purchase does not receive more
weights than a small purchase.  The second measure is constructed to check the robustness of the
finding to the possibility that a few very large investors dominate the net purchase numbers.
To avoid possible biases in quantifying the trading behavior, we exclude certain
observations (investors or stock-month).  First, investors who are registered after December 31,
1996 are dropped because their entrance to the market could show up only as a buy.  Second,
investors who declare their purpose of the stock purchase as direct investment are excluded
because they do not engage in active trading.  Third, stocks that have  reached foreign ownership
limit are dropped because any change in the net position of the foreign investors as a whole has
to be a sell to Korean investors.  Fourth, observations (stock-month) involving stocks not initially
owned by any foreign investors are also excluded.
Results and Interpretations
Table 2 reports the basic finding using scale-adjusted net purchase as a measure of trading
direction.  For the entire sample period (97.1-98.6) (the top panel) and for foreign investors as a
whole, there is a net sell for each portfolio.  However, comparing across the five portfolios, one
sees clearly that foreign investors sell worst performers (in terms of the previous-month returns)
much more aggressively than the best performers.  Indeed, in the sixth row, we report a formal t-
test on difference between the mean purchase of the best performing portfolio (stocks in row 5)
and that of the worst performing portfolio (stocks in row 1).  The standard errors are reported in
parenthesis
2.  We see the difference is positive and statistically significant.  This is consistent
with the view that investors as a whole for the whole sample period are positive feedback traders
(although they only sell the best recent performing stocks less aggressively rather than buy them).7
Looking only at the universe of foreign investors for the whole sample period masks
important differences in trading patterns in different time periods across different sub-groups of
investors. The middle and lower two panels look at the trading behavior during the pre-crisis and
the in-crisis periods separately.  In each panel, the third and fourth columns decompose foreign
investors into those residing in Korea and those outside.  In the last three columns, non-resident
investors are further decomposed into Asian, American, and other investors.
It is worthwhile to highlight some key findings. (1) Before the crisis broke out in
November, 1997, the resident institutional traders in fact sell the recently best performing stocks,
and buy the recently worst performing stocks.  The mean difference in the net purchase between
the two portfolios is -0.183 and statistically significant at the five percent level.  Thus, they are
negative feedback (or contrarian) traders.  (2) In the pre-crisis period, it is the non-resident
institutional investors (whether they are in the U.S., Asia, or elsewhere) who are positive
feedback traders.  (3)  In the pre-crisis period, resident individual investors may also be negative
feedback traders, although the evidence is not statistically significant.
(4)  During the crisis, non-resident institutional traders’ tendency to engage in positive
feedback trading (i.e., selling recent worse performers more aggressively) is reinforced.  (5) On
the other hand, resident foreign institutions and resident foreign individuals have switched to
become positive feedback traders themselves, although the evidence on this is less strong.
As a robustness check (against the possibility of a few large trades executed by a small
number of investors), Table 3 reexamines this issue using buyers’ ratio as a measure of foreign
investors’ trading direction but otherwise replicating the  reporting format.  The results are
broadly similar as before.  In particular, all of the five findings stated before remain to be true in
Table 3.
Certain type of positive feedback trading pattern can be an artifact of coincidence.  For
example, economic reforms that generally improve the stock returns
3 in that country can occur
simultaneously as the country liberalizes its policies on capital inflows.  In this case, foreign
capital inflows can appear to follow a rise in (market-wide) stock returns.  It is useful to note that
the type of positive feedback trading investigated in this paper is across stocks within a given
market, and hence cannot be explained by this logic.
                                                                                                                                                                                          
2 The same reporting format is used for all sub-groups of investors in all time periods.8
Another possible defense is that foreign investors (residing abroad) maybe
informationally disadvantaged relative to domestic investors.  They may take a (relatively
greater) decline in the price of a particular stock as unfavorable news revealed by domestic
investors, and may therefore rationally choose to sell it (more aggressively relative to other
stocks) (See Brennan and Cao, 1997, for such a model).  It may be useful to check if the positive-
feedback trading pattern in our sample is ex post profitable.  We do it in two steps.   First, in each
month, we form an equally-weighted portfolio of ten best performing stocks, and another
equally-weighted portfolio of ten worst performing stocks, based on the previous month’s return
as defined above for Tables 2 and 3.  The average returns of the two portfolios in the previous
months are reported in the first row of each of the three panels (representing three different
periods) in Table 4 (labeled as “horizon -1”). Second, we track their performances over the
subsequent six months.   The results are reported in the other rows of Table 4 (labeled as
“horizons 1-6”).  We perform a difference in mean test (mean return of the past winners minus
that of the past losers) and find that the difference is negative for all six horizons under
investigation.  The difference is statistically significant for the one- and two-month horizons at
the ten percent level.  In another words, the data suggest that the relative ranking of stock
performance reverses itself in the sample.  On average, if one has to choose between a negative
and a positive feedback trading strategy, the former would have been profitable, at least at the
one- or two-month horizon.  The excess return is quantitatively large at a 9% monthly rate.
As a robustness check, we also form equally-weighted portfolios of 30 best performing
stocks and 30 worst performing (based on previous-month’s returns).  The results are reported in
the right half of Table 4.  For these enlarged portfolios, again, there is reversal in the ranking of
relative performance.  In fact, the recent past losers outperform the recent winners, in a
statistically significant and quantitatively large way, over one-month, two-month, and so on, all
the way to five-month horizons.  Again, a contrarian trading strategy rather than a positive
feedback one would have been profitable.  As qualifications, we note that our tests have not
adjusted for risk levels of the stocks, and do not preclude the possibility that a positive feedback
trading strategy could be profitable within a day or for horizons longer than six months.
                                                                                                                                                                                          
3 Bekaert and Harvey (1998) and Henry (1997) for evidence on this.9
4. Herding
Herding is the tendency that investors of a particular group mimic each other’s trading.
Portfolio investors may herd rationally or irrationally.  Informational asymmetry may cause
uninformed but rational speculators to choose to trade in the same way as informed traders
(Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch, 1992; and Banerjee, 1992).   Since informational problem
may be more serious when it comes to investing in a foreign market than the domestic one,
herding may be more severe correspondingly.
This logic suggests that (1) individual investors may herd more than the institutions as the
latter may have more resources to assemble and process information about a foreign market; and
(2) non-resident investors may herd more than resident foreign investors assuming the latter have
more timely information about the country they live in.
There is an alternative explanation for herding among institutional investors.  Unlike
individual investors, fund managers face regular reviews (e.g., quarterly for mutual funds, and
annually for pension funds) on their performance relative to a benchmark and/or to each other.
This may induce them to mimic each other’s trading to a greater extent than they otherwise
would (See Scharfstein and Stein, 1990).  This logic suggests an opposite prediction from the
informational asymmetry story, that (1) institutional investors may herd more than individual
investors, and that (2) there is no presumption to argue for greater herding for non-resident
institutional investors than their resident counterparts (assuming both face the same regular
relative performance comparisons).
There have been several empirical papers that quantify herding behavior.   Using data on
institutional investors, the pioneering paper by Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (or LSV, 1992),
followed by work by Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1995), and Wylie (1997), all report
evidence of herding among US or UK institutional investors.  Using data on foreign investors (or
U.S. investors) in Korea as a single group, Choe, Kho, and Stulz (1998) find evidence of herding.
None of the previous papers that we are aware of compares different herding tendencies by
different investor types on data from a single source, which is the central focus of this section of
our paper.10
Methodology and Sample Construction
We employ the herding indices proposed by LSV (1992) but construct the sample in a
way that takes into account the Wylie (1997) correction for possible bias induced by short-selling
constraint.  Let  ) , , ( t j i B  be the number of investors in group i that have increased the holdings
of stock j in month t(i.e., number of net buyers),  and ) , , ( t j i S  the number of investors in group
i that have decreased the holdings of stock  j  in month t(number of net sellers).  Let  ) , ( t i p  be
the number of net buyers in group i aggregated across all stocks in month t divided by the total
number of active traders (number of net buyers plus number of net sellers) in group i aggregated
across all stocks in month  . t    Then,  ) , , ( t j i H  is defined as the herding index for investors in
group i, on stock , j in month  . t
(1)  ) , (
) , , ( ) , , (
) , , (
) , (
) , , ( ) , , (
) , , (
) , , ( t i p
t j i S t j i B
t j i B
E t i p
t j i S t j i B
t j i B

















t j i S t j i B




) , , ( ) , , (

























) , , (
1
) (
H(i, t) is the herding index for group i in month t, averaged across all stocks.  H(i) is the
herding index for group i, averaged across all months in the sample.  In the definition of H(i, j, t),
) , ( t i p is subtracted to make sure that the resulting index is insensitive to general market
conditions (i.e., a bull or bear market).  By taking absolute values, the first term in equation (1)
captures how much of the investment is polarized in the direction of either buying or selling.
The second term in equation (1), also called as adjustment factor, is subtracted to correct for the
mean value of the first term under the assumption of no herding.
4  The second term can be
                                                          
4 Also, the adjustment factor [the second term in equation (1)] is a decreasing function of the number of traders11
computed under the assumption that  ) , , ( t j i B  follows a binomial distribution.  Note that for large
N and T,  ) , ( t i H and  ) (i H  follow normal distributions by the central limit theorem.
To avoid any possible bias in computing the herding indices, we exclude certain investors
and observations (stock-month) from our sample.  Like the sample we have constructed to
examine positive feedback trading, we exclude here (1) investors that are registered after
December 31, 1996,  (2) investors who buy stocks for direct investment purpose, (3) stock-
months for which the foreign ownership limit is reached, and (4) stock-months for which the
stocks are not owned by foreign investors in the previous month.   The last exclusion is
motivated by the short-selling constraint.  When short selling is not allowed, any trade on that
stock would have to first show up as a buy, thus biasing the herding index upward (Wylie, 1997).
Finally, if a stock in a given month is traded by only one foreign investor in that group, that
observation is dropped.
Results and Interpretations
The basic results are presented in Table 5.  For each investor group i and sample period,
we report the corresponding herding statistics, H(i),  with standard errors in the parenthesis
below.   Then we perform a sequence of difference-in-mean tests between individual and
institutional investors (reported in Rows 4, 8, and 12), between pre-crisis and in-crisis periods for
any given group of investors (reported in Rows 13-15), and between non-resident and resident
investors of any given group (reported in Column 4).
A number of patterns stand out.  First, almost all groups of foreign investors exhibit
positive herding statistics that are statistically significant.  The only possible exception is the set
of resident institutional investors.
Second, individual investors’ herding statistics (about 0.11) are nearly twice as large as
those of the institutional investors (between 0.05 and 0.06).  This is true before the crisis as well
as during the crisis.  It is true whether we look at those residing in Korea or those outside (Rows
4, 8, and 12 of Table 5).
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Third,  non-resident institutional investors or non-resident individual investors always
herd more than their resident counterparts.  This is again true during the crisis as well as before
(Column 4).
Fourth, from the pre-crisis to the in-crisis periods, there is no statistically significant
change in the herding tendency of individual investors, whether they are resident or non-resident.
In comparison, for institutional investors as a whole, there is statistically significant increase in
the herding statistics (the cell in Row 15/Column 1).  On the other hand, within the set of the
institutional investors, the increase in the herding statistics, while positive, is not statistically
significant at the ten percent level, either for the subset of the non-residents alone or for the
subset of residents alone (the cells in Row 15/Columns 2-3).  The combination of the results on
the institutional investors probably suggests that during the crisis period, there is an increase in
the similarity of trading between the resident and non-resident subgroups, though not within each
subgroup.
Within the set of non-resident foreign investors, we have also computed herding statistics
for various subsets of Asian and U.S. investors (not reported to save space) before and during the
crisis.   Before the crisis, the U.S. investors (as a whole, the subset of institutions, or the subset of
individuals) herd more than their Asian counterparts.  During the crisis, however, the difference
between the U.S. and Asian investors have disappeared.
The findings that individual investors herd more than institutions and that non-residents
herd more than the residents are consistent with the theory that herding is induced by
informational asymmetry.  At the same time, the contrast between institutional investors (who are
subject to regular relative performance evaluations) and individuals (who are not) suggests that
the incentive to herd driven by the relative performance review considerations is probably not the
dominant feature of the data.
Our results on the relative herding tendencies help to explain an observation made by
Choe, Kho, and Stulz (1998): the herding statistics for the universe of foreign investors (which
includes individuals and non-resident investors) are much larger than those for U.S. mutual funds
reported by Wermers (1998).13
Ex post Rationality
Herding indices essentially measure the degree of correlation in trading behaviors among
investors in a given group.  As such, they do not by themselves distinguish between two
possibilities: that investors intentionally (rationally or not) mimic each other’s trading, versus
that investors respond to common information about the fundamentals.
To distinguish between the two is difficult which is probably why previous empirical
papers do not do this.  We decide to provide some suggestive evidence here by examining ex post
rationality of the herding behavior in our sample.  If the high values of herding statistics in our
sample simply reflect the fact that the investors are responding to common information and these
information are return-relevant, then, we would expect that those stocks that the investors herd
more aggressively should yield abnormal returns (relative to those stocks they do not herd as
much).
Let
1 + jt R  denote the return of stock j from t to t+1 in excess of the KOSPI return minus the
won exchange rate depreciation.  Let jt H denote LSV herding index for stock j in month t,
and jt NP the (scale-adjusted) net purchase of stock j in month t.   All three variables are defined
for a given investor group, i , which we omit from the subscripts for simplicity.  For each
investor group, we run the following fixed effects regression:
(7)
jt jt jt k t jt NP H R e b b a a a + + + + + = + ) ( 1 0 1
where  t a and  k a  are time and industry dummies
5.   Under the null hypothesis that herding within
a given group is the group’s response to a common and return-relevant information, we would
expect  1 b  to be positive.  We perform this regressions for both the one-month and three-month
investment horizons.  The results are reported in Table 6.
In overwhelming number of groups, we see that the estimates of  1 b  are not different from
zero, and sometimes with a negative sign.  This is true for both the one-month and three-month
horizons. The main exception for the one-month horizon is the group of non-resident institutions
in the pre-crisis period.  No group during the crisis has a positive 1 b  that is statistically
                                                          
5 Due to computer capacity constraint, we use 67 industry dummies instead of over 600 stock dummies.14
significant.   For the three-month horizon, the basic conclusion holds.  The main exception is the
subset of individual Asian non-resident investors during the crisis period.   As a robustness
check, we also use the buyers’ ratio (as defined before) in place of the scale-adjusted net
purchase, and obtain very similar findings (not reported to save space).
Stock Characteristics and Herding
It may be useful to see if the degree of herding is related to a number of stock
characteristics that are relatively easy to be observed by foreign investors. The first characteristic
we examine is affiliation with the top five chaebols.  Chaebols are family-run conglomerates that
dominate the Korean corporate sector.  The top five chaebols are Hyundai, Samsung, LG,
Daewoo, and Sunkyong.  Each of them invests in a diverse number of sectors, including cars,
ships, and electronic equipment.  There are 62 stocks in our sample that are affiliated with the top
five chaebols.
Because each of the top chaebols permeates in many aspects of the economy, it invariably
includes small-to-medium companies that are less known to foreign investors.  Therefore, we
also look at the second characteristic of the stock, whether they are reported on a daily basis in
the Wall Street Journal’s World Stock Market page.  There are 19 stocks that fall into this group
(see the explanation to Table 7 for a complete list of the 19 companies), two of which are not
associated with any chaebols.  (Obviously, there are 45 stocks in the sample that are affiliated
with the top five chaebols, but not reported by the Wall Street Journal on a regular basis.)
We create two dummies, “Chaebol-5”, and “WSJ-19”, respectively for these two
characteristics.  Besides, we also look at the prior-month turnover of the stock, prior-month
market capitalization, and prior month returns in excess of the KOSPI index.  We also create a
dummy for the crisis period (since November 1997).
For each of the four groups of foreign investors (resident individuals, resident institutions,
non-resident individuals, and non-resident institutions), we regress the herding statistics on the
stock characteristics discussed above.  The results are reported in Table 7. [We have also
performed regressions on various subset of stock characteristics.  The results are not reported to
save space.]  In general, there is no evidence that any foreign investor group herd more on stocks
associated with the top five chaebols.  In comparison, there is statistically significant evidence15
that non-resident institutional investors (but not other groups) do herd more on stocks reported
regularly in the Wall Street Journal, and on stocks that have more extreme returns in the previous
month.   Note that these results are obtained after we control for liquidity (proxied by turnover)
and size (measured by market capitalization) of the stocks.
5.  Reaction to News
Informational asymmetry is a fundamental problem in financial markets.  As noted, it is
likely to be more severe when it comes to investing in a foreign market.  In this section, we make
an attempt to examine whether resident and non-resident investors’ trading difference can be
linked to differences in their information sets.
We construct two news data sets by searching four major Western daily newspapers plus
a Korean paper using Dow-Jones Interactive and Lexis-Nexis.  The Western news set (labeled as
Western-4) include Wall Street Journal (WSJ), Financial Times (FT), New York Times (NYT),
Washington Post (WP).  And the Korea news set is based on the Korea Herald (KH) -- the only
major Korean paper that can be searched electronically throughout the sample
6.
The news sets are constructed in three steps.  First , for the four Western papers, we
extract any article containing “Korea” and “Economy” in its headline or lead paragraph.  For the
Korean Herald, we obtain any article containing the word “Economy”.   Second, we apply a filter
rule to the news: news that are of minor significance and that are not obviously good nor bad are
dropped.  Letters to the editors are also dropped while newspaper commentaries are kept.  For the
Western-4 news set, overlapping news on the same date are also dropped.  Third, we count the
number of good and bad news for each news set in each month.   Generally speaking, any article
containing the announcement of  a liberalization measure, a restructuring effort, an IMF
agreement or a foreign assistance program is regarded as good news (G).  Any article that reports
new discovery of debt level, failure of major corporations, downgrade of bond ratings,
depreciation of the Japanese yen, and the like is labeled as bad news (B).  We avoid speculating
on the general equilibrium effects of a given news but choose to follow the “conventional”
wisdom at the time of the news.  For example, the effect of an IMF program is controvertial ex
                                                          
6 For May and June, 1997, the Korea Economy Daily (KED) is used instead of KH due to problems of the Dow16
post, but was perceived as good news by the market according to newspaper reports at the time.
As an illustration, Table 8 presents a subset of the news for the month of November, 1997.
We use the difference between the Western-4 and the Korean Herald as a measure of the
difference in the information sets between non-resident and resident investors.  Obviously, there
is a big noise-to-signal ratio in this measure.  First, the labeling of good versus bad news involves
judgement.  Second, investors potentially have many information sources in addition to these
newspapers.  Third, the simple count of good and bad news, adopted here for our data sets, is not
likely to be accurate in describing the intensity of the news.   Nonetheless, conversations with
institutional fund managers indicate that many funds do not have staff in all the emerging
markets they invest in, and often do not have the ability or time to process the information from
local news sources.  Precisely because our measure of informational asymmetry is very coarse, it
would be all the more interesting if we find any association between the difference in trading
behavior and the difference in news coverage.
In Table 9, Columns 4-7 report the news counts for the Western-4 and the Korean Herald,
respectively.   Columns 8 and 9 report the difference in the good and bad news (i.e., G-B) for the
two news sets.  Column (10) reports the difference between the Korean Herald and the Western-4
in terms of the good/bad news (which we could label as KH’s relative-relative good news, or
news gap).
There are some interesting difference in the reporting of the Korean economy.  For
example, we see that in the eight months leading up to November, 1997, the entries in Column
10 are all positive (or at least zero), meaning that the Western newspapers had been reporting
relatively more bad news (or relatively less good news) as compared with the Korean Herald.  In
fact, in the month of November, 1997, when the foreign exchange crisis broke out, the four
Western papers carried far more bad news (24) than good news (6).  In contrast, the news in the
Korean Herald was less skewed (11 bad news and 12 good news).
Immediately after the start of the crisis, from December, 1997, to February, 1998, the
reverse became true.  That is, the Korean Herald started to report relatively more bad news than
the Western 4.  Since March, 1998 to the end of the sample, the Western-4 would again report
relatively more bad news.
                                                                                                                                                                                          
Jones database.  KED is not consistently available for the whole sample.17
In Columns 1 and 2 of Table 9, (scale-adjusted) net purchases by the U.S. non-resident
investors and by all resident investors are reported.  Column 3 reports the difference between the
two (resident’s net purchase minus that of the U.S. non-residents).  The second to the last row
reports the correlation between the resident’s net purchase relative to that of the non-resident
Americans (Column 3), and the Korean Herald’s number of relative good news minus that of the
Western-4 papers (Column 10).  The correlation is 0.24.  The fact that it is positive is consistent
with the hypothesis that the relative news received by non-resident U.S. investors may have
influenced their net purchase (or sell) of the Korean stocks relative to the resident investors.
Similarly, we have tabulated the difference in net purchase by resident and non-resident
individual investors, and that by resident and non-resident institutional investors (not reported to
save space).  Their correlations with the difference in news are 0.32 and 0.18, respectively.
Therefore, when the Western newspapers carry more bad news than the Korean paper, non-
resident individuals or institutions, on average, tend to sell the Korean stocks more than their
respective resident counterparts.  The difference in the news coverage appears to have a greater
impact on the trading patterns of the individuals.
The small number of the observations (18 months in total) and the noise in our news data
set make it impossible to conduct any definitive test.  Thus, our results should be interpreted with
a big grain of salt.
6. Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we study foreign investors’ trading behavior in the Korea Stock Exchange
(KSE) during January 1997 – June 1998 using a unique data set that details every foreign
investor’s monthly stock positions.
There are a number of findings that are worth highlighting here.  First, before the crisis
broke out in November, 1997, those institutional investors inside Korea were contrarian (or
negative feedback) traders (i.e. buying recent losers and selling recent winners).  However, they
switch to become positive feedback traders during the crisis period.  In contrast, the non-resident
institutional investors have been consistently engaged in positive feedback trading, and the
tendency is reinforced during the crisis period.  Since the return data in the sample exhibits18
mean-reversion in horizons from one to six months, it appears that a negative feedback strategy
would have been profitable ex post.
Second, individual investors herd significantly more than institutional investors.  And
non-resident investors (institutional as well as individual) herd significantly more than their
resident counterparts.  Herding may have slightly increased during the crisis period, but the
change is largely insignificant.  Furthermore, non-resident institutional investors herd more on
the 19 stocks regularly reported in the Wall Street Journal, but not unusually so on stocks
belonging to the top five Korean Chaebols.  On an  ex post basis, at least during the crisis period
and without adjusting for risk, those stocks that the foreign investors herd to buy or herd to sell
do not appear to carry abnormally positive or negative returns.
Third, major Western and Korean papers carry different numbers of good relative to bad
news about the Korean economy.  For example, in the months leading up to November, 1997, the
Western papers reported relatively more bad news.  This difference in news is correlated with the
difference in the net selling of the Korean stocks by the non-resident investors relative to that of
their resident counterparts.19
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Note: The investor number refers to the number of unique investor ID codes.  The investors in the table include only those
who registered at the Korea Securities Supervisory Board (KSSB) before December 31, 1996 and who are portfolio
investors.  The first row in each cell counts the number of investors who held at least one share of stock in the first section of
the Korea Stock Exchange (KSE) any month during the sample period.  Subsequent figures are the numbers of investors that
hold at least one share of stock on three dates: Jan. 31, 1997, Nov. 29, 1997, and June 30, 1998.
Table 1b: Market Value of the Stock Positions of Foreign Investors
(On Dec. 27, 1996, Nov. 29, 1997, and Jun 30, 1998)


































































 Notes:  (1) Each cell in the table reports the market values of the stock positions for a given investor group on three dates:
Dec. 27, 1996,  Nov. 29, 1997,  and June 30, 1998.  Only those investors who are included in Table 1a are included here.
(2) The market values of all the stocks listed on the first section of the Korean Stock Exchange are 88,853 (Dec. 27, 96),
61,401 (Nov. 29, 97), and 50,256 (Jun 30, 98) billion wons, respectively.22
Table 2.  Positive Feedback Trading (Net Purchase)
prior-month
performance
all res non-res asian usa others
whole all (1)     -2.247 ~ -0.170 -0.3210 -0.2967 -0.3022 -0.3992 -0.1207 -0.3231
period (2)     -0.169 ~ -0.069 -0.2809 -0.1103 -0.2906 -0.3223 -0.1833 -0.3263
(3)     -0.068 ~ -0.001 -0.2276 -0.1139 -0.2276 -0.2017 -0.1056 -0.2994
(4)     -0.001 ~  0.092 -0.1489 -0.1029 -0.1647 -0.1444 -0.0691 -0.2239
(5)      0.092 ~  0.092 -0.0698 -0.0049 -0.1100 -0.0680 0.0548 -0.1755
(6) = (5) – (1) 0.251 (0.033)* 0.292 (0.059)* 0.192 (0.032)* 0.331 (0.047)* 0.176 (0.047)* 0.148 (0.038)*
ind (7)     -2.247 ~ -0.170 -0.2526 -0.3237 -0.2241 -0.2455 -0.2579 -0.2765
(8)     -0.169 ~ -0.069 -0.2148 -0.1235 -0.3478 -0.0343 -0.4351 -0.3333
(9)     -0.068 ~ -0.001 -0.1322 -0.0357 -0.2366 0.6000 -0.4468 -0.1596
(10)   -0.001 ~  0.092 -0.1726 -0.1464 -0.2700 0.2000 -0.3297 -0.2977
(11)    0.092 ~  0.092 -0.1246 -0.1086 -0.2417 -0.1972 -0.2850 -0.2536
(12) = (11) – (7) 0.128 (0.067)* 0.215 (0.081)* 0.018 (0.099) 0.048 (0.221) 0.027 (0.127) 0.023 (0.183)
ins (13)   -2.247 ~ -0.170 -0.3283 -0.3272 -0.3085 -0.3953 -0.1220 -0.3228
(14)   -0.169 ~ -0.069 -0.2982 -0.1514 -0.2922 -0.3298 -0.1723 -0.3251
(15)   -0.068 ~ -0.001 -0.2469 -0.2980 -0.2355 -0.2047 -0.1104 -0.3110
(16)   -0.001 ~  0.092 -0.1512 -0.2886 -0.1698 -0.1514 -0.0499 -0.2285
(17)    0.092 ~  0.092 -0.1100 -0.1411 -0.1123 -0.0718 0.0635 -0.1780
(18) = (17) – (13) 0.218 (0.031)* 0.186 (0.075)* 0.196 (0.032)* 0.323 (0.048)* 0.186 (0.049)* 0.145 (0.038)*
pre- all (b1)   -1.040 ~ -0.107 -0.2879 0.0449 -0.3200 -0.3190 -0.1664 -0.3678
crisis (b2)   -0.107 ~ -0.047 -0.2699 0.0369 -0.2843 -0.2767 -0.1865 -0.3449
period (b3)   -0.047 ~  0.003 -0.1964 -0.0899 -0.2131 -0.1902 -0.1251 -0.2448
(b4)    0.003 ~  0.070 -0.1446 -0.0888 -0.1670 -0.1153 -0.0866 -0.2619
(b5)    0.070 ~  1.012 -0.1454 0.0073 -0.1712 -0.1081 0.0341 -0.2472
(b6) = (b5) – (b1) 0.143 (0.042)* -0.038 (0.074) 0.149 (0.039)* 0.211 (0.057)* 0.201 (0.066)* 0.121 (0.046)*
ind (b7)   -1.040 ~ -0.107 -0.1430 0.0071 -0.4353 0.0000 -0.4707 -0.4398
(b8)   -0.107 ~ -0.047 -0.0953 0.0411 -0.3293 0.2500 -0.4845 -0.4483
(b9)   -0.047 ~  0.003 -0.1148 0.0252 -0.2108 0.5556 -0.3498 -0.0505
(b10)  0.003 ~  0.070 -0.1942 -0.1350 -0.3206 0.4000 -0.4296 -0.1609
(b11)  0.070 ~  1.012 -0.1156 -0.0991 -0.2753 0.1111 -0.3006 -0.2606
(b12) = (b11) – (b7) 0.027 (0.090) -0.106 (0.109) 0.160 (0.129) 0.111 (0.564) 0.170 (0.149) 0.179 (0.229)
ins (b13) -1.040 ~ -0.107 -0.3021 0.0329 -0.3191 -0.3189 -0.1311 -0.3611
(b14) -0.107 ~ -0.047 -0.2919 -0.0562 -0.2926 -0.2892 -0.1850 -0.3526
(b15) -0.047 ~  0.003 -0.2065 -0.2966 -0.2133 -0.1901 -0.1241 -0.2582
(b16)  0.003 ~  0.070 -0.1500 -0.3116 -0.1751 -0.1272 -0.0556 -0.2663
(b17)  0.070 ~  1.012 -0.1578 -0.1498 -0.1710 -0.1126 0.0550 -0.2507
(b18) = (b17) – (b13) 0.144 (0.039)* -0.183 (0.096)* 0.148 (0.039)* 0.206 (0.057)* 0.186 (0.068)* 0.110 (0.046)*
in- all (d1)   -2.247 ~ -0.345 -0.3173 -0.3802 -0.3160 -0.4093 -0.1335 -0.3272
crisis (d2)   -0.344 ~ -0.141 -0.3118 -0.4833 -0.2446 -0.3644 -0.0675 -0.2735
period (d3)   -0.141 ~ -0.013 -0.2832 -0.3432 -0.2532 -0.3356 -0.1359 -0.3046
(d4)   -0.013 ~  0.148 -0.1363 -0.1643 -0.1373 -0.1790 0.0224 -0.1545
(d5)    0.149 ~  1.698 -0.0052 -0.1075 -0.0112 0.0131 0.0365 -0.0526
(d6) = (d5) – (d1) 0.312 (0.052)* 0.273 (0.101)* 0.305 (0.053)* 0.423 (0.079)* 0.170 (0.076)* 0.275 (0.065)*
ind (d7)   -2.247 ~ -0.345 -0.2919 -0.3709 -0.2389 -0.3422 -0.1718 -0.3043
(d8)   -0.344 ~ -0.141 -0.3164 -0.4664 -0.0974 0.0000 -0.2191 -0.2797
(d9)   -0.141 ~ -0.013 -0.3009 -0.3011 -0.2427 0.0446 -0.3939 -0.0566
(d10) -0.013 ~  0.148 -0.1339 -0.2297 -0.1752 -0.3333 -0.1751 -0.3323
(d11)  0.149 ~  1.698 -0.1442 -0.1121 -0.2489 -0.1680 -0.2975 -0.3220
(d12) = (d11) – (d7) 0.148 (0.109) 0.259 (0.140)* 0.010 (0.150) 0.174 (0.287) 0.126 (0.219) -0.018 (0.271)
ins (d13) -2.247 ~ -0.345 -0.3342 -0.4396 -0.3190 -0.4046 -0.1438 -0.3254
(d14) -0.344 ~ -0.141 -0.3162 -0.4786 -0.2587 -0.3651 -0.0687 -0.2738
(d15) -0.141 ~ -0.013 -0.2968 -0.4470 -0.2614 -0.3399 -0.1568 -0.3079
(d16) -0.013 ~  0.148 -0.1557 -0.2308 -0.1408 -0.1733 0.0257 -0.1583
(d17)  0.149 ~  1.698 -0.0302 -0.2320 -0.0157 0.0057 0.0287 -0.0561
(d18) = (d17) – (d13) 0.304 (0.053)* 0.208 (0.126) 0.303 (0.054)* 0.410 (0.081)* 0.173 (0.077)* 0.269 (0.065)*
Stock-months are divided into five groups according to prior-month return, defined as return in excess of the KOSPI return mimus the won depreciation
against the US dollar.  For each group, the mean value of net purchase [=(no. of shares purchased - no. of shares sold) / (no. of shares traded)] is reported.
The whole period covers December, 1996-June,  1998.  The first half of the sample up to and including October, 1997 is defined as the pre-crisis sub-
period.  The remaining eight months are the in-crisis sub-period. Within each investor group and sample period, t-test is performed on the buyer’s ratio for
stocks that are best and worst performers in the previous month.  Standard errors are in the parentheses.   * indicates significant at the 10%  level.23
Table 3.  Positive Feedback Trading (Buyer's Ratio)
prior-month
performance
all res non-res asian usa others
whole all (1)     -2.247 ~ -0.170 0.3249 0.3595 0.3344 0.2961 0.4199 0.3392
period (2)     -0.169 ~ -0.069 0.3642 0.4481 0.3554 0.3433 0.4087 0.3387
(3)     -0.068 ~ -0.001 0.3808 0.4588 0.3789 0.4010 0.4411 0.3393
(4)     -0.001 ~  0.092 0.4207 0.4502 0.4159 0.4320 0.4492 0.3912
(5)      0.092 ~  0.092 0.4578 0.4893 0.4351 0.4696 0.5255 0.3937
(6) = (5) – (1) 0.133 (0.015)* 0.130 (0.028)* 0.101 (0.014)* 0.173 (0.022)* 0.106 (0.022)* 0.055 (0.018)*
ind (7)     -2.247 ~ -0.170 0.3625 0.3361 0.3842 0.3802 0.3780 0.3535
(8)     -0.169 ~ -0.069 0.3870 0.4348 0.3243 0.4835 0.2934 0.3333
(9)     -0.068 ~ -0.001 0.4371 0.4723 0.3821 0.8000 0.2756 0.4181
(10)   -0.001 ~  0.092 0.4170 0.4282 0.3635 0.6000 0.3441 0.3485
(11)    0.092 ~  0.092 0.4419 0.4422 0.3902 0.4315 0.3708 0.3721
(12) = (11) – (7) 0.079 (0.033)* 0.106 (0.040)* 0.006 (0.048) 0.051 (0.110) 0.007 (0.062) 0.019 (0.090)
ins (13)   -2.247 ~ -0.170 0.3227 0.3388 0.3337 0.2928 0.4212 0.3375
(14)   -0.169 ~ -0.069 0.3565 0.4297 0.3560 0.3395 0.4197 0.3386
(15)   -0.068 ~ -0.001 0.3697 0.3698 0.3752 0.3964 0.4422 0.3337
(16)   -0.001 ~  0.092 0.4219 0.3670 0.4152 0.4268 0.4612 0.3915
(17)    0.092 ~  0.092 0.4392 0.4219 0.4345 0.4673 0.5349 0.3925
(18) = (17) – (13) 0.117 (0.014)* 0.083 (0.036)* 0.101 (0.015)* 0.175 (0.022)* 0.114 (0.023)* 0.055 (0.018)*
pre- all (b1)   -1.040 ~ -0.107 0.3730 0.5237 0.3479 0.3567 0.4055 0.3196
crisis (b2)   -0.107 ~ -0.047 0.3695 0.5169 0.3574 0.3627 0.4145 0.3279
period (b3)   -0.047 ~  0.003 0.3995 0.4896 0.3864 0.4044 0.4325 0.3592
(b4)    0.003 ~  0.070 0.4227 0.4509 0.4174 0.4456 0.4493 0.3767
(b5)    0.070 ~  1.012 0.4385 0.5022 0.4129 0.4608 0.5106 0.3707
(b6) = (b5) – (b1) 0.066 (0.019)* -0.021 (0.035) 0.065 (0.018)* 0.104 (0.026)* 0.105 (0.031)* 0.051 (0.021)*
ind (b7)   -1.040 ~ -0.107 0.4243 0.5033 0.2947 0.5000 0.2735 0.2734
(b8)   -0.107 ~ -0.047 0.4409 0.5226 0.3207 0.6250 0.2520 0.2759
(b9)   -0.047 ~  0.003 0.4522 0.5161 0.3881 0.7778 0.3071 0.4775
(b10)  0.003 ~  0.070 0.4017 0.4301 0.3494 0.7000 0.3062 0.4107
(b11)  0.070 ~  1.012 0.4432 0.4455 0.3691 0.5556 0.3693 0.3762
(b12) = (b11) – (b7) 0.019 (0.044) -0.058 (0.054) 0.074 (0.064) 0.056 (0.282) 0.096 (0.074) 0.103 (0.113)
ins (b13) -1.040 ~ -0.107 0.3676 0.5267 0.3516 0.3566 0.4310 0.3218
(b14) -0.107 ~ -0.047 0.3583 0.4758 0.3544 0.3566 0.4208 0.3237
(b15) -0.047 ~  0.003 0.3905 0.3909 0.3865 0.4029 0.4372 0.3540
(b16)  0.003 ~  0.070 0.4249 0.3573 0.4163 0.4390 0.4702 0.3757
(b17)  0.070 ~  1.012 0.4245 0.4251 0.4133 0.4580 0.5253 0.3690
(b18) = (b17) – (b13) 0.057 (0.017)* -0.102 (0.045)* 0.062 (0.018)* 0.102 (0.026)* 0.094 (0.032)* 0.047 (0.022)*
in- all (d1)   -2.247 ~ -0.345 0.3167 0.3169 0.3189 0.2812 0.4131 0.3370
crisis (d2)   -0.344 ~ -0.141 0.3234 0.2692 0.3684 0.3175 0.4466 0.3577
period (d3)   -0.141 ~ -0.013 0.3396 0.3216 0.3554 0.3321 0.4261 0.3539
(d4)   -0.013 ~  0.148 0.4173 0.4064 0.4204 0.4006 0.4861 0.4081
(d5)    0.149 ~  1.698 0.4760 0.4445 0.4718 0.4954 0.5220 0.4363
(d6) = (d5) – (d1) 0.159 (0.023)* 0.128 (0.048)* 0.153 (0.024)* 0.214 (0.037)* 0.109 (0.035)* 0.099 (0.030)*
ind (d7)   -2.247 ~ -0.345 0.3423 0.3037 0.3541 0.3333 0.3929 0.3478
(d8)   -0.344 ~ -0.141 0.3250 0.2563 0.4542 0.5000 0.4060 0.3482
(d9)   -0.141 ~ -0.013 0.3515 0.3343 0.3870 0.5232 0.3429 0.4667
(d10) -0.013 ~  0.148 0.4405 0.3924 0.4081 0.3333 0.3986 0.3417
(d11)  0.149 ~  1.698 0.4412 0.4404 0.3937 0.4722 0.3682 0.3205
(d12) = (d11) – (d7) 0.099 (0.052)* 0.137 (0.069)* 0.040 (0.072) 0.139 (0.143) 0.025 (0.107) 0.027 (0.133)
ins (d13) -2.247 ~ -0.345 0.3121 0.2948 0.3230 0.2796 0.4064 0.3356
(d14) -0.344 ~ -0.141 0.3222 0.2547 0.3582 0.3067 0.4488 0.3552
(d15) -0.141 ~ -0.013 0.3335 0.2545 0.3519 0.3251 0.4175 0.3516
(d16) -0.013 ~  0.148 0.4110 0.3673 0.4192 0.3996 0.4875 0.4095
(d17)  0.149 ~  1.698 0.4654 0.3839 0.4703 0.4907 0.5240 0.4351
(d18) = (d17) – (d13) 0.153 (0.024)* 0.089 (0.060) 0.147 (0.025)* 0.211 (0.038)* 0.118 (0.036)* 0.100 (0.030)*
Stock-months are divided into five groups according to prior-month return, defined as return in excess of the KOSPI return mimus the won depreciation
against the US dollar.  For each group, the mean value of buyers' ratio [=(no. of buyers) / (no. of  traders)] is reported. The whole period covers December,
996-June,  1998.  The first half of the sample up to and including October, 1997 is defined as the pre-crisis sub-period.  The remaining eight months are
the in-crisis sub-period.  Within each investor group and sample period, t-test is performed on the buyer’s ratio for stocks that are best and worst
performers in the previous month.  Standard errors are in the parentheses.   * indicates significant at the 10%  level.24




Returns of 10 Best & Worst Performers Returns of 30 Best & Worst Performers
Best Worst Difference s.e. Best Worst Difference s.e.
-1 0.536 -0.589 1.125** 0.044 0.368 -0.440 0.809** 0.019
1 -0.080 -0.002 -0.078** 0.038 -0.083 -0.007 -0.077** 0.019
2 -0.161 -0.077 -0.084 0.057 -0.152 -0.083 -0.069** 0.028
3 -0.256 -0.142 -0.114* 0.064 -0.228 -0.108 -0.120** 0.033
4 -0.279 -0.201 -0.078 0.070 -0.295 -0.169 -0.126** 0.037
5 -0.342 -0.285 -0.057 0.084 -0.332 -0.239 -0.094** 0.041




Returns of 10 Best & Worst Performers Returns of 30 Best & Worst Performers
Best Worst Difference s.e. Best Worst Difference s.e.
-1 0.523 -0.370 0.893** 0.022 0.368 -0.279 0.646** 0.011
1 -0.067 -0.036 -0.031 0.040 -0.064 -0.010 -0.054** 0.020
2 -0.148 -0.192 0.044 0.072 -0.145 -0.155 0.010 0.037
3 -0.288 -0.273 -0.015 0.084 -0.257 -0.196 -0.061 0.044
4 -0.367 -0.386 0.019 0.096 -0.373 -0.315 -0.057 0.052
5 -0.467 -0.484 0.017 0.116 -0.446 -0.384 -0.063 0.056




Returns of 10 Best & Worst Performers Returns of 30 Best & Worst Performers
Best Worst Difference s.e. Best Worst Difference s.e.
-1 0.597 -0.615 1.212** 0.045 0.401 -0.446 0.847** 0.018
1 -0.095 -0.001 -0.094** 0.035 -0.099 -0.008 -0.090** 0.018
2 -0.173 -0.069 -0.105* 0.054 -0.164 -0.072 -0.092** 0.027
3 -0.254 -0.143 -0.111* 0.061 -0.227 -0.105 -0.121** 0.031
4 -0.279 -0.201 -0.078 0.070 -0.295 -0.169 -0.126** 0.037
5 -0.342 -0.285 -0.057 0.084 -0.332 -0.239 -0.094** 0.041
6 -0.460 -0.362 -0.098 0.087 -0.381 -0.340 -0.041 0.045
We form protfolios of best and worst performers based on the previous month excess returns (reported in the rows labeled as
“horizon -1”), and then track their relative performance in the subsequent six months (reported in rows labeled as “horizons
1-6”).   The return (for a given stock) is defined as  (lnPt - lnPt-1) - (lnKt - lnKt-1) - (St - St+1), where Pt is stock price, Kt is
KOSPI market index, and St is spot exchange rate (won/US dollar).  Since price data is available only up to October 1998,
the computations are constrained accordingly.  ** and * denote significant at the 5% and 10% levels, respectively.25
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Note: Standard errors are in the parentheses.  **  and * denote significant at the 5% and 10% levels, respectively.26
Table 6.  Ex-Post Rationality on Herding (Net Purchase)






Asian Investors US Investors
b0 b1 b0 b1 b0 b1 b0 b1 b0 b1
Whole All 0.005 0.007 0.007 0.027 0.006 -0.005 0.007 -0.010 0.000 0.017
period Investors (0.005) (0.026) (0.009) (0.042) (0.006) (0.027) (0.007) (0.036) (0.008) (0.037)
Individual 0.014 0.001 -0.012 0.018 0.018 -0.013 0.222 -0.847 0.040 -0.111
Investors (0.015) (0.063) (0.022) (0.088) (0.031) (0.123) (0.214) (0.907) (0.050) (0.190)
Institution. 0.002 0.026 0.009 0.018 0.002 0.014 0.005 0.006 -0.002 0.036
Investors (0.006) (0.027) (0.011) (0.059) (0.006) (0.028) (0.007) (0.035) (0.009) (0.039)
Pre-Crisis All -0.002 0.034 0.004 0.062** -0.005 0.042 -0.008 0.022 0.001 0.018
period (0.005) (0.024) (0.007) (0.036) (0.006) (0.026) (0.006) (0.028) (0.008) (0.033)
Individual 0.013 -0.017 0.002 0.036 0.023 -0.029 -0.475 1.653 0.019 -0.005
(0.011) (0.045) (0.018) (0.073) (0.022) (0.085) (0.805) (3.372) (0.036) (0.139)
Institution -0.004 0.051** 0.007 0.066 -0.007 0.052** -0.008 0.022 -0.001 0.026
(0.005) (0.025) (0.010) (0.053) (0.006) (0.026) (0.006) (0.029) (0.008) (0.036)
In-Crisis All 0.015 -0.045 0.015 -0.046 0.021* -0.090 0.033* -0.112 0.001 0.004
period (0.012) (0.057) (0.021) (0.098) (0.012) (0.058) (0.020) (0.097) (0.016) (0.075)
Individual -0.002 0.097 -0.046 -0.005 0.001 0.055 0.238 -0.827 0.078 -0.209
(0.032) (0.136) (0.050) (0.204) (0.057) (0.235) (0.241) (1.025) (0.128) (0.470)
Institution 0.011 -0.022 0.009 -0.027 0.013 -0.054 0.029 -0.061 -0.001 0.041
(0.012) (0.059) (0.024) (0.121) (0.013) (0.061) (0.020) (0.102) (0.016) (0.075)






Asian Investors US Investors
b0 b1 b0 b1 b0 b1 b0 b1 b0 b1
Whole All -0.017** 0.065 0.002 0.109* -0.011 0.015 -0.022** 0.044 -0.003 0.057
(0.009) (0.041) (0.012) (0.061) (0.010) (0.044) (0.011) (0.053) (0.013) (0.056)
Individual 0.004 0.101 0.003 0.027 -0.005 0.230 -1.169** 4.742 0.032 0.226
(0.022) (0.089) (0.029) (0.119) (0.044) (0.172) (0.422) (1.759) (0.068) (0.253)
Institution -0.018** 0.064 -0.002 0.074 -0.013 0.015 -0.023** 0.018 -0.003 0.056
(0.009) (0.043) (0.016) (0.086) (0.010) (0.044) (0.011) (0.053) (0.014) (0.060)
Pre-Crisis All -0.017** 0.053 0.007 0.084 -0.013 0.028 -0.033** 0.048 -0.006 0.062
period (0.009) (0.042) (0.013) (0.063) (0.010) (0.045) (0.010) (0.049) (0.013) (0.056)
Individual 0.011 0.114 0.007 0.131 -0.014 0.272 -0.775 3.054 0.022 0.170
(0.022) (0.087) (0.032) (0.133) (0.047) (0.179) (1.415) (5.931) (0.073) (0.279)
Institution -0.017** 0.047 0.002 0.126 -0.014 0.024 -0.033** 0.030 -0.004 0.040
(0.009) (0.044) (0.017) (0.093) (0.010) (0.045) (0.010) (0.049) (0.014) (0.061)
In-Crisis All -0.019 0.116 -0.007 0.201 -0.008 0.005 0.014 0.001 0.005 0.062
period (0.021) (0.099) (0.028) (0.131) (0.022) (0.103) (0.031) (0.154) (0.029) (0.130)
Individual -0.026 0.304 -0.005 -0.127 -0.001 0.278 -1.347** 5.614** 0.090 0.398
(0.046) (0.197) (0.061) (0.254) (0.081) (0.336) (0.484) (2.050) (0.151) (0.520)
Institution. -0.024 0.124 -0.033 0.048 -0.013 0.013 0.010 -0.032 0.003 0.107
(0.021) (0.101) (0.031) (0.158) (0.022) (0.105) (0.032) (0.160) (0.028) (0.131)
Note:
jt jt jt t k jt NP H R e b b a a a + + + + + = + ) ( 1 0 1
where  1 + jt R , Return from t to  t +1for stock  j ; at , Month dummy;   k a , Industry dummy;  jt H , Herding index at time  t  for
stock  j ;  jt NP , Scale adjusted net purchase at time  t  for stock  j .27
Table 7.  Stock Characteristics and Herding
Independent Variables Dependent Variable: Herding Indices
Residents Non-residents

































Prior-month Turnover (no. of shares traded









Prior-month Stock Market Capitalization



















No. of Observations 314 430 331 3,805
Adjusted R Squares -0.0104 0.0022 0.0031 0.0032
Notes: WSJ-19 is a dummy for the 19 stocks reported daily in the World Stock Markets section of The Wall Street Journal.
They are Dacom, Daewoo Heavy Industry, Hyundai Engineering and Construction, Hyundai Electronics Industrial, KEPCO,
Kia Motor, Koomin Bank, LG Chemical, LG Electronics, LG Information and Communication, LG Semicon, POSCO,
Shinhan Bank, SK Telecom, Samsung Display Devices, Samsung Electronics, Ssangyong Oil Refinery, and Yukong.
Chaebol-5 is a dummy for the 62 stocks in the sample affiliated with the five largest Chaebols (Hyundai, Samsung, LG,
Daewoo, and Sunkyong).   Crisis is a dummy for the sample period, November, 1997-June, 1998.  Standard errors are in
parentheses.28
Table 8.  Illustrative News (November, 1997)
Date Headlines or Lead Sentences Source Label
3-Nov South Korea Economy Feels The Pressure --- Government's Heavy Hand Can't ... WSJ B
4-Nov All the fretting about south Asia has risked disguising a larger problem: South Korea FT B
5-Nov Wobbly Banks Threaten to Drag Down Korea WSJ B
10-Nov South Korea's Markets Grow Weaker --- Debt Falls to Junk Levels As Stocks ... WSJ B
10-Nov S Korea candidates skirt round realities FT B
10-Nov Troubled Economy Stirs Fears in South Korea NYT B
12-Nov Asia's Chain Reaction WSJ B
12-Nov Yen slides as officials keep silent FT B
12-Nov Korean currency slide shakes economy FT B
13-Nov Fed Leaves Interest Rates Unchanged (Fed was to raise interest rate) WP G
18-Nov Korea's Won Slides as Bureaucrats Feud --- Protests by Bank Regulators ... WSJ B
19-Nov South Korea's Currency Crisis Deepens And Two Top Officials Suddenly Quit WSJ B
19-Nov Symptoms Worsening For S. Korean Economy; Currency Drop, Talk of Bailout… WP B
20-Nov Korea Moves to Tackle Economic Woes WSJ G
20-Nov Korea's Troubles Worsen As Pressure for Aid Grows NYT B
21-Nov U.S. and IMF Prepare a Rescue for South Korea --- Seoul Dithers as the Won ... WSJ G
21-Nov Japan aid for Seoul 'to come after IMF deal' (Japan turned down aid-offer before IMF) FT B
21-Nov S Korea admits credit cuts (Japanese banks refusing to roll-over) FT B
22-Nov S. Korea Rescue May Be Risky Course WP B
24-Nov Korea Faces Painful Economic Restructuring --- IMF Terms May Spell ... WSJ B
24-Nov Seoul under pressure on 'shameful' IMF deal (domestic resistance) FT B
25-Nov APEC set to back Asian stability plan FT G
25-Nov Japan's Folly Drags Asia Down WSJ B
25-Nov Koreans Bail Out of Stocks on Austerity Fears --- Investors Worry IMF Plan ... WSJ B
25-Nov For Korean Bank, 'Worst Is Almost Ended' NYT G
27-Nov Asian Markets: Korea to Boost Its Funds In Effort to Lower Rates (monetary expansion) WSJ G
27-Nov Seoul warned on union anger FT B
28-Nov Bond reform fails to excite FT B
28-Nov S. Korean Official Says $20 Billion Not Enough WP B
29-Nov A wounded tiger reluctant to change its stripes FT B
This is a subset of the news reported as an illustration.  Using Lexis-Nexis and Dow-Jones Interactive, we search for news
about the Korean economy in five daily newspapers: Wall Street Journal (WSJ), Financial Times (FT), New York Times
(NYT), Washington Post (WP), and Korean Herald (KH). The news are then filtered according to a rule explained in the
text.29
 Table 9. Differences in Net Purchase and News
(resident vs. non-resident US investors)































Jan 97 0.1954 -0.1088 -0.3042 3 6 1 6 -3 -5 -2 -0.125
Feb 97 0.2178 -0.1227 -0.3406 0 6 3 7 -6 -4 2 0.125
Mar 97 -0.1072 -0.0737 0.0336 2 4 4 11 -2 -7 -5 -0.238
Apr 97 -0.1194 0.0825 0.2019 0 5 5 6 -5 -1 4 0.250
May 97 -0.0401 0.5722 0.6122 1 2 6 5 -1 1 2 0.143
Jun 97 0.1093 0.5485 0.4392 1 0 3 1 1 2 1 0.200
Jul 97 -0.1172 -0.5019 -0.3847 0 2 8 6 -2 2 4 0.250
Aug 97 -0.0725 -0.1555 -0.0831 1 4 7 10 -3 -3 0 0.000
Sep 97 -0.1932 -0.5038 -0.3106 1 4 7 6 -3 1 4 0.222
Oct 97 -0.5604 0.0515 0.6120 5 4 14 12 1 2 1 0.029
Nov 97 -0.3397 -0.0117 0.3280 6 24 12 11 -18 1 19 0.358
Dec 97 -0.2960 -0.0778 0.2182 19 18 11 17 1 -6 -7 -0.108
Jan 98 0.2131 -0.0902 -0.3033 6 4 11 12 2 -1 -3 -0.091
Feb 98 0.0745 0.0087 -0.0658 9 4 15 14 5 1 -4 -0.095
Mar 98 0.0351 -0.9247 -0.9597 4 2 7 5 2 2 0 0.000
Apr 98 0.1503 0.2379 0.0876 2 4 21 9 -2 12 14 0.389
May 98 -0.0740 0.0352 0.1092 5 5 17 8 0 9 9 0.257
Jun 98 -0.0260 0.1431 0.1692 7 4 11 0 3 11 8 0.364
Correlation Coefficient between Columns (3) and (10) 0.2105
Correlation Coefficient between Columns (3) and (11) 0.2411
a (11) = (10) / [(4) + (5) + (6) + (7)]Figure 1.  Exchange Rate Level





































































































































































































































Figure 3.  Current Value of US $100 
(Invested in KOSPI on January 1, 1997)
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